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Etienne FORESTIER-PEYRAT
RED PASSAGE TO IRAN: 
tHE Baku tradE Fair and tHE unmaking oF tHE 
azErBaijani BordErland, 1922−1930*
On September 15, 1922, the red flag was raised on the Caspian shore to 
celebrate the opening of the first Baku trade fair. Even though a commercial 
fair had existed in the city since the 1880s, it was a relatively minor event.1 
Now, the fair was to be integrated in the global strategy of the new Bol-
shevik regime toward the Muslim East. A year later, in 1923, the chairman 
of the Azerbaijani Council of People’s Commissars, Gazanfar Musabekov, 
made this strategy plain: “Azerbaijan is a door wide open on the East and a 
carrier of socialist revolutionary ideas to backward peoples of the Orient.”2 
His statement referred to the hopes of the world revolution starting in the 
* The author sincerely thanks Ab Imperio peer reviewers and editors for their insight-
ful comments and suggestions. This research has been financed by the Institut français 
d’études anatoliennes (IFEA, Observatoire du Caucase) and the Institut français de 
Géorgie. The author would like to thank Gilles Authier, Natalia Gladchenko, Omar 
Tushurashvili, and Gilles Carasso for their support during his research trips.
1 Azərbaycan Respublikası Dövlət Arxivi (State Archive of Azerbaijan, ARDA). F. 349. 
Op. 1. D. 14. L. 8, quoted in Yashar Zakir Ogly Abdullaev. ZSFSR v razvitii Sovetsko-
Iranskikh otnoshenii, 1922−1928 gg. Baku, 1986. P. 45; Mikhail Katkov. Sobranie 
peredovykh Moskovskikh Vedomostei. Moscow, 1898. Vol. 23. Pp. 213-214; in 1885, 
the Times mentioned a project to establish a bigger fair in Baku: The Russians in Central 
Asia // The Times. 1885. 11 February. P. 5. 
2 Gazanfar Musabekov. Doklad o deiatel’nosti pravitel’stva Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, 
sdelannyi 26 noiabria 1923 g. na III Vseazerbaidzhanskom s’’ezde Sovetov // Gazanfar 
Musabekov. Izbrannye stat’i i rechi. Vol. 1: 1920−1927 gg. Baku, 1960. P. 86; Dietrich 
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East, still fostered by the Komintern and leading Party activists. Beyond 
this utopian dimension, it had another, more descriptive meaning. Since its 
integration to the tsarist empire in 1828, Russian Azerbaijan had remained 
tightly connected to the Middle East and, above all, Northern Iran.3 This 
connection was economic, demographic, cultural, and intellectual. The 
constitutional revolution of 1906−11 in Iran demonstrated that it could also 
be political, as Caucasian revolutionaries took an active part in supporting 
the constitutionalist movement until its suppression by Russian forces.4 In 
a way, all that the Bolshevik leaders in the Caucasus and Moscow had to do 
was to harness this existing hub and tailor it to their own ends. Revolutionary 
ideas would travel along old commercial routes, together with goods and 
merchants, from Baku to Iran, Afghanistan, or Turkey. 
The new Soviet regime did not limit itself to taking up and adapting ex-
isting spatial configurations and networks. My argument is that the interwar 
period witnessed a radical transformation of the geography of Soviet border-
lands. This spatial revolution paralleled the socialist remodeling of society.5 
In the Caucasus and Central Asia, the spatial aspect of the revolution was 
at first more effective than the socialist one. Whereas the social and cultural 
structure of autochtonous societies could not be entirely overhauled over a few 
years, the Soviet state succeeded in effectively severing the transimperial and 
transnational connections these regions had with the wider Muslim world.6 
Geyer. Die Sowjetunion und Iran – Eine Untersuchung zur Aussenpolitik der UdSSR im 
Nahen Osten. Tübingen, 1955. P. 32.
3 Marvin L. Entner. Russo-Iranian Commercial Relations, 1828−1914, Gainesville, 
1965; S. S. Ostapenko. Persidskii rynok i ego znachenie dlia Rossii. Kiev, 1913; G. I. 
Ter-Gusakov. Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie interesy Rossii v Persii. St. Petersburg, 
1916; Firuz Kazemzadeh. Russia and Britain in Iran, 1864−1914: A Study in Imperial-
ism. New Haven, 1968. 
4 Houri Berberian. Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905−1911: 
The Love for Freedom Has no Fatherland. Boulder, 2001; Iago Gocheleishvili. Introduc-
ing Georgian Sources for the Historiography of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 
(1905−1911) // Houchang E. Chehabi, Vanessa Martin (Eds.). Iran’s Constitutional 
Revolution. Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections. 
London and New York, 2010. Pp. 45-68; Moritz Deutschmann. Cultures of Statehood, 
Cultures of Revolution: Caucasian Revolutionaries in the Iranian Constitutional Move-
ment, 1906−1911 // Ab Imperio. 2013. No. 2. Pp. 165-190. 
5 Insights into the spatial implications of Stalinism can be found in Evgeny Dobrenko, Eric 
Naiman (Eds.). The Landscape of Stalinism. The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space. Seattle 
and London, 2003; Marie-Claude Morel. Territoire et stratégies soviétiques. Paris, 1982. 
6 Numerous books and articles have been devoted to this issue. See, for example, 
Eva-Maria Auch. Muslim-Untertan-Bürger. Identitätswandel in gesellschaftlichen 
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Soviet communism reshaped the mental map of the Caucasus by tightly link-
ing it to Russia. The tsarist regime had partially initiated this extraction of 
Russian Azerbaijan from its Middle Eastern environment, but never came to 
the point of breaking the connection between the “two Azerbaijans,” to use 
Tadeusz Swietochowski’s term.7 The Soviet spatial revolution should not, 
however, be associated simply with the sealing off of the border.8 The Asian 
border was not effectively secured until the mid-1930s. In the 1920s, the 
spatial revolution was above all about taking under control, transforming, and 
reshaping the existing border institutions. In the Caucasus, the establishment 
of the Baku trade fair can be interpreted as such an attempt to take control 
of transborder relations with Iran and other Muslim countries. 
This attention to the spatial dimension of the communist transformation, 
which has been studied by scholars dealing with internal Soviet politics (focus-
ing on issues such as national demarcations, building of new cities, upheavals 
in the countryside), points to a wider theoretical issue.9 In a seminal essay 
concerning “imperial formations,” Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGrana-
han remind us that empires are “ongoing polities of dislocation, dependent 
on refiguring spaces and populations.”10 From that point of view, the early 
Soviet regime could indeed be classified as an imperial formation. Obviously, 
not all actors involved in this imperial refiguring had the same conception of 
the way the Soviet space was to be remade. This was especially true in the 
new Bolshevik Caucasus. There, the existence of a complex federal structure 
from 1922 to 1936, topped by the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Transformationsprozessen der muslimischen Ostprovinzen Südkaukasiens. Wiesbaden, 
2004; Ada Holly Shissler. Between Two Empires. Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey. 
New York and London, 2003; Christian Noack. From Ancestry to Territory – Spatial 
Dimensions of Muslim Identity in Imperial Russia // Ab Imperio. 2006. No. 2. Pp. 81-100.
7 Tadeusz Swietochowski. Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York, 
1995; see also Touraj Atabaki. Azerbaijan. Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran. 
London and New York, 2000; Raoul Motika, Michael Ursinus (Eds.). Caucasia between 
the Ottoman Empire and Iran, 1555−1914. Wiesbaden, 2000. 
8 For a useful, but now somehow outdated overview, see Andrea Chandler. Institutions 
of Isolation. Montreal and London, 1998.
9 Arne Haugen. The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia. Basing-
stoke and New York, 2003; Francine Hirsch. Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge 
and the Making of the Soviet Union. Ithaca and London, 2005; Adrienne Lynn Edgar. 
Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkestan. Princeton, 2004; Svetlana Gorshenina. 
Asie centrale. L’invention des frontières et l’héritage russo-soviétique. Paris, 2012. 
10 Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan. Refiguring Imperial Terrains // Ab Imperio. 
2006. No. 2. Pp. 24-25; see also Eric Tagliacozzo. Secret Trades, Porous Borders, Smug-
gling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865−1915. Singapore, 2007. 
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Republic (ZSFSR), ensured a high degree of regional autonomy in the 1920s, 
but also an abundance of numerous internal contradictions.11 For Caucasian 
leaders, relationships with the neighboring states of Turkey and Iran were 
part of their prerogatives, and they had an objective interest in maintaining 
a regional management of cross-border interactions, through various forms 
of “multilayered diplomacy.”12 The Transcaucasian leadership had to con-
tend and negotiate with both the regional authorities, in the three socialist 
republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and the central government, 
in Moscow. The result of the spatial revolution in the Caucasus was eventu-
ally the dwindling of cross-border relations. This was not a linear process, 
but the outcome of conflicts and opposing interests. 
This conflict process will be approached through the prism of the Baku 
trade fair, which was one of the border institutions, whose successive evolu-
tions contributed to the unmaking of the Caucasian borderlands. Playing a 
prominent role in both internal and external trade, the fair connected Trans-
caucasia and other Soviet republics with the Muslim East and became an 
important manifestation of the New Economic Policy (NEP).13 It was a major 
venue for importing Iranian raw materials and agricultural products, and 
exporting Soviet manufactures. From the very beginning, the fair provoked 
heated debates. As one can expect, ideological objections were central to 
what appeared to be a mix of precapitalist and capitalist practices.14 Most 
important, however, the fair became a contested political resource claimed 
by several leaders in the Caucasus locked in rivalry over influence in the 
11 General Soviet-era accounts of the Transcaucasian federal experiment can be found 
in S. V. Kharmandarjan. Splochenie narodov v stroitel’stve sotsializma (Opyt ZSFSR). 
Moscow, 1982; R.A. Gevondjan. Konstitutsionnoe stroitel’stvo v Zakavkazskoi federatsii 
(1922−1936 gg.). Erevan, 1981; F. F. Kasim-Zade. Druzhba i bratskoe sotrudnichestvo 
sotsialisticheskikh natsii Zakavkaz’ia. Baku, 1961; E. A. Skripilev (Ed.). Sovetskoe gosu-
darstvo i pravo v period stroitel’stva sotsializma (1921−1935 gg.). Moscow, 1968. Pp. 77-84. 
12 See Brian Hocking. Localizing Foreign Policy. Non-Central Governments and Multi-
layered Diplomacy. New York, 1993; for an early study of Soviet “para-diplomacy,” see 
Vernon V. Aspaturjan. The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy – A Study of Soviet 
Federalism in the Service of Soviet Foreign Policy. Genève and Paris, 1960.
13 In Western historical literature, the Baku fair is barely mentioned. See for example 
E. H. Carr. Socialism in One Country, 1924−1926. Part 2. New York, 1958. P. 634. Soviet 
Azerbaijani historians devoted more attention to it from a strictly economic point of view, 
and without much conceptual treatment.
14 I. B. Orlov. Problemy edinoi ekonomiki // S. A. Pavliuchenkov (Ed.). Rossiia nepovs-
kaia. Moscow, 2002. Pp. 150-165; Arup Banerji. Merchants and Markets in Revolutionary 
Russia, 1917−1930. Basingstoke and New York, 1997; Marjorie L. Hilton. Selling to the 
Masses: Retailing in Russia, 1880−1930. Pittsburgh, 2011. 
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region.15 Archival sources used for this research are essentially drawn from 
the regional archives containing documents of the Transcaucasian authorities. 
They are complemented by other Soviet, Western, and Iranian documents 
tracing the rise of the Baku fair to the role of a major partner in trade with 
Iran until 1926, and its subsequent crisis and demise by 1930.16 The story 
of the Baku fair shows that the formation of the Soviet society was not just 
an internal affair, but involved a major restructuring of the Transcaucasia 
region – both as a fairly integrated economic system and as an object of 
mental geography. To create socialist Azerbaijan, the border with its southern 
neighbors had to be sealed, in order to envision this fragment of a larger 
historical region as an entity in its own right as well as to impose a particu-
lar socioeconomic regime there. At the same time, transnational trade was 
indispensable to the Soviet economy in the 1920s. The Soviet authorities 
were torn between these two contradictive imperatives, and they struggled 
to solve the problem of sustaining economic ties across the increasingly 
solidified border, both symbolic and material.
Azerbaijani autonomy and the birth of the Baku fair
World War I drew a dividing line in the history of the Caucasus. Mili-
tary operations extended not only to the Russo-Ottoman border in Eastern 
Anatolia but also to Iran, where a politically intricate situation developed 
against the backdrop of the proclaimed neutrality of Iran.17 Its Northwestern 
15 The Transcaucasian federation remains too easily dismissed as a sham in historiography. 
Ronald Grigor Suny speaks about a “pseudo-federal system” in Looking Toward Ararat: 
Armenia in Modern History. Indianapolis, 1993. Pp. 140-142. See also Richard Pipes. The 
Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917−1923. Cambridge, 
MA, 1964. P. 254; for general information on Soviet federalism see Terry Martin. The Af-
firmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923−1939. Ithaca 
and London, 2001; Friedrich-Christian Schroeder and Boris Meissner (Eds.). Bundestaat 
und Nationalitätenrecht in der Sowjetunion. Berlin, 1974; a rather theoretical approach in 
Tania Raffass. The Soviet Union: Federation or Empire? London and New York, 2012. 
16 For unknown reasons and despite repeated requests, I have been denied access to 
Azerbaijani archives. My references to them are limited to quotations made by other 
authors and information kindly transmitted by Azerbaijani and foreign researchers. As 
for central Soviet archives, the Russian State Archive of Economics (RGAE) in Moscow 
contains documents related to the Baku fair in its funds 413 (Russian People’s Commis-
sariat for Foreign Trade) and 8151 (Russian People’s Commissariat for Internal Trade). 
17 Touraj Atabaki (Ed.). Iran and the First World War. Battleground of the Great Powers. 
London, 2006. Pp. 163-180; Oliver Bast (Ed.). La Perse et la Grande Guerre, Tehran, 
Institut français de recherche en Iran, 2002. 
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provinces served as ground for the rivalry of the belligerent countries. Old 
trading networks collapsed due to the severed border regime imposed by 
the tsarist government, and to compensate for this, contraband thrived. The 
periods of Caucasian independence and Civil War, from 1918 to early 1921, 
dealt another blow to transborder regional connections, by raising new bar-
riers, disorganizing the infrastructure, and ruining the economy. Menshevik 
Georgia did try to negotiate with nationalist Azerbaijan conventions on 
railways, visas, and trade, but they remained largely dead letters.18 National 
antagonisms, land and border conflicts between the three Caucasian republics 
constituted a major obstacle to commercial integration. As an alternative to 
Caucasian unity, Azerbaijani leaders strove to intensify relationships with 
Iran, but the Sovietization of Azerbaijan in late April 1920 put an end to 
this diplomatic initiative.19
Sovietization did not mean the immediate loss of independence, as 
Bolshevik leaders initially employed the imperial practice of manipulat-
ing “degrees of sovereignty.”20 The relative autonomy of Azerbaijan relied 
on, and manifested itself through, the still existing transnational space that 
connected Azerbaijan to the new Kemalist Turkey and Northern Iran. The 
Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee proclaimed the monopoly on foreign 
trade in August 1920, but at the same time sought to revitalize commercial 
contacts with Northern Iran and Turkey.21 In March 1921, the committee 
dispatched three trade missions with extended credit lines to Northern Iran 
to buy food and daily-use commodities. Famine was rife in the Russian 
Federation, and the central Bolshevik government hoped to procure the 
much-needed food from Iran. But the Azerbaijani rulers were no less con-
cerned about the needs of their own republic, so Azerbaijani and Russian 
trade officials dispatched to Northern Iran clashed endlessly in 1920−21 
over procurement priorities. At times, the Transcaucasian authorities ignored 
18 See, for example, archives of the Georgian legation in Baku: Sak’artvelos Saistorio 
tsentraluri ark’ivi (Georgian Central Historical Archive, SSTsA). F. 1867. Op. 1. D. 30, 
and 31; Op. 2. D. 3, 8, and 15. 
19 On the attempt to develop links between late Qajar Iran and the independent Caucasian 
states, see Kavah Bayat. Tûfân bar farâz-i Qafqâz: nigâhî bih munâsabât-i mintaqah’î-i 
Irân va gumhûrî’hâ-yi Azarbayjan, Armanistân va Grujistân dar dawrah-i nukhust-i 
istiqlâl-i 1917−1921. Teheran, 2001; Rizâ Âzarî Shahrizâyî (Ed.). Hî’at fawq al-‘âdah-i 
Qafqâzîyah. Teheran, 2000. 
20 Ann Laura Stoler. On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty // Public Culture. 2006. Vol. 
18. Pp. 125-146. 
21 Q. H. Bünyadov. Bərpa dövründə (1921−1925-ci illər) Azərbaycanda Sovet 
ticarətinin yaranması ve inkişafı. Baku, 1971. Pp. 87-88; Vasif Qafarov. Türkiyə-Rusiya 
münasibətlərində Azərbaycan məsələsi (1917−1922). Baku, 2011. 
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Moscow’s decrees on external trade altogether, blocking goods bound to 
Russia at the border, which provoked furious protests from the local repre-
sentatives of Russian Federation trade agencies.22
The creation of the Baku fair was the central element of the attempt to 
restore the Transcaucasian networks that were disrupted in 1914−20.23 It 
was also a powerful political argument, using the advantages of the bor-
der situation of Azerbaijan within the new Bolshevik state to enhance the 
republic’s importance and the influence of its leaders. On May 13, 1922, 
the head of the Baku economic commission, Volodia Parushin, chaired a 
conference of local economic organizations, which discussed the possibil-
ity of creating a full-fledged fair in the city. The initiative was backed by 
Baksovet (the Baku City Council), and aimed at transforming the city into 
a hub of middle eastern trade.24 Participants in the conference and follow-
up meetings pointed to numerous problems impeding the project. The state 
monopoly on foreign trade was criticized as the major obstacle to economic 
contacts with Iran. The Moscow-based People’s Commissariat of Foreign 
Trade (NKVT, Vneshtorg), which de facto had a say in the foreign trade of 
all Soviet republics, was the butt of criticism for its adamant refusal to lift 
the monopoly on kerosene, sugar, and other commodities sought after in 
Iran.25 Another problem involved the protectionist policies of some Soviet 
republics that controlled the flow of goods across their borders. Turkestan 
was a popular target of this criticism, which also pointed implicitly to 
neighboring Armenia and Georgia.26
The conflicts of interests became apparent when Vneshtorg attempted 
to secure control over trade with Iran. At the end of May 1922, representa-
tives of Vneshtorg and the Baku fair committee were invited to the Central 
22 Obviously, similar incidents still occurred in early 1923. See Letter from Shumiatskii 
to the Transcaucasian Union Council, with a copy to Stalin, Karakhan, and Frumkin, 
January 6, 1923 // Sakartvelos uakhlesi istoriis tsentraluri arkivi (Central State Archive 
for Contemporary History of Georgia, SUITA). F. 617. Op. 1. D. 67. L. 45.
23 The revival of fairs and exhibitions characterized post–World War I Europe, signifying 
creation of a new economic geography after the dramatic reconfiguration of political 
borders. See Alexander C. T. Geppert. Welttheater: Die Geschichte des europäischen 
Ausstellungswesens im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Ein Forschungsbericht // Neue Politische 
Literatur. 2002. No. 1. Pp. 10-61; Janet Ward. Weimar Surfaces: Urban Visual Cultures 
in 1920s Germany. Berkeley, 2001. Pp. 50-51. 
24 Protocol of the Baku fair committee, May 13, 1922 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. D. 493. L. 4. 
25 Protocol of the Baku fair committee, May 27, 1922 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. D. 493. L. 6. 
26 Protocol of the Transcaucasian Soviet, under Narimanov’s chairmanship, 12 October 
1922 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. D. 294. L. 9; Baku Fair Committee. Bakinskaia iarmarka 
1922 goda. Otchet komiteta. Baku, 1922. Pp. 8-9. 
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Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party. The delegate of the fair 
committee, Novikov, argued in favor of partially lifting the monopoly so as 
to allow trade with Iran. However, the Central Committee ceded to pressure 
from the central government agency (Vneshtorg) and declared that since 
the presence of Iranian merchants at the fair was unlikely, and because the 
“coincidence in time of the Baku and Nizhegorod fairs could have a negative 
impact on the Nizhny Novgorod fair,” the Baku fair should not be opened 
in 1922.27 This decision evoked sharp debate among the fair organizers. In 
view of its geographical situation on the Caspian littoral, Baku appeared to 
be the “natural place” to connect Northern Iran with Transcaucasia and other 
Soviet republics. After much debate, the majority resolved to cancel the fair 
for 1922, and instead to better prepare for 1923. However, the newly elected 
president of the Transcaucasian SFSR, Nariman Narimanov, became furious 
as he learned of the decision, and demanded that the fair should take place, 
“in view of its tremendous economic relevance for the region.” A major 
political figure in Transcaucasia and the front man of Azerbaijani “national 
communism,” Narimanov insisted at a session of the Caucasian Party Bureau 
that Azerbaijan should hold the fair and retain its autonomy in foreign trade 
relations.28 This intervention overruled the initial decision by the Azerbaijani 
Central Committee that had been forced upon it by Moscow lobbyists. 
In their struggle for control over transborder trade, leaders of Azerbai-
jan had to negotiate an alliance with the newly established Transcaucasian 
authorities as intermediaries in their dealing with Moscow. In March 1922, 
the interrepublican Transcaucasian People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade 
(ZNKVT) was established, and took over the functions of the former repub-
lican Commissariats of Foreign Trade, but was subordinate to the central 
NKVT.29 The Georgian capital, Tiflis (Tbilisi), which, at the same time, 
was the capital of the ZSFSR, became an intermediary between Baku and 
Moscow. The coalition between Tiflis and Baku ensured the implementation 
by the time of the fair of the new “Asian tariff” passed on April 23, 1922, 
by the Moscow NKVT. It contained reductions compared to the European 
27 Protocol No. 4 of the Baku fair committee, May 28, 1922 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. 
D. 493. L. 8. 
28 Protocol No. 5 of the Baku fair committee, May 30, 1922 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. 
D. 493. L. 9; Suha Bolukbaşı. Azerbaijan, a Political History. London and New York, 
2011. Pp. 38-39. 
29 It was called the Obvneshtorg, and later Zaknarkomvneshtorg (ZakNKVT). In August 
1922, the operational part of the Obvneshtorg – entrusted with carrying foreign trade – was 
carved out of the commissariat to create the Zakgostorg. For details, see Q. H. Bünyadov. 
Bərpa dövründə. P. 91.
87
Ab Imperio, 4/2013
tariff and was intended to convey the Bolsheviks’ intention to help Asian 
countries escape the capitalist world system.30 The Transcaucasian Commis-
sariat for Trade proved to be an invaluable partner, as it had more weight 
in negotiations with Moscow than former republican agencies.31 In early 
September 1922 the customs situation was clarified, when the Transcau-
casian Commissar for Foreign Trade, Mamed Gasan Gadzhinskii, and the 
plenipotentiary of the Moscow NKVT in Tiflis, M. I. Frumkin, confirmed 
that the Asian tariff was to be applied.32 Frumkin later confirmed that the 
foreign trade monopoly would be suspended for numerous goods during 
the fair, allowing Iranian merchants and private companies to benefit from 
participating in it.33
The arduous prehistory of the first Baku fair partially explains its ultimate 
failure. Local newspapers featured uninspiring reports about commercial 
activity at the fair. The Berlin emigrant newspaper Dni published a very 
negative account of the fair on May 7, and explained the sluggish com-
merce by the mutual lack of trust among the participants.34 The local Iranian 
community had been heavily stricken by nationalizations and confiscations 
during the Civil War and felt strong resentment toward the Soviet regime.35 It 
remained heavily suspicious of the New Economic Policy and the proclaimed 
freedom of trade at the fair. Propagandist efforts by the fair committee and 
Azerbaijan agents in Northern Iran apparently had little effect.36 There was 
30 It was itself subdivided into two categories: one for goods imported across the Afghan, 
Chinese, and Mongol borders, as well as from Iran to Turkestan; another for goods im-
ported through the Iranian and Turkish borders to Transcaucasia. The first category was 
more advantageous; see the Decision of the Sovnarkom RSFSR on the Asian customs 
tariff, April 23, 1922 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. D. 493. L. 34-35. 
31 Telegram from the Zaknarkomvneshtorg (NKVT ZSFSR) to the Russian NKVT, un-
dated (June 1922) // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. D. 295. L. 12; Vladimir Serov. Spravochnik 
Bakinskoi iarmarki. 1924 god. Baku, 1924. Pp. 3-4. 
32 Telegram from Gadzhinskii and Frumkin to Musabekov, president of the Azerbaijani 
Sovnarkom, September 6, 1922 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. D. 493. L. 69. 
33 Protocol No. 12 of the Baku fair committee, August11, 1922 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 
1. D. 493. L. 20. 
34 Quoted in Joseph Castagné. Russie Slave et Russie Turque // Revue du monde musul-
man. 1923. December. Vol. 56. Pp. 233-234. 
35 The Iranian government demanded indemnities for this loss, and negotiations continued 
until 1925−26. Mahmud Tâherahmadi. Ravâbit-e Irân o Shuravi dar dowre Rizâ Shâh. 
Teheran, 2006. P. 149. 
36 Sir P. Loraine to Lord Curzon, Tehran, September 25, 1922 // Public Record Office 
(PRO). FO 416/71. P. 201; Baku Fair Committee. Bakinskaia iarmarka 1922 goda. P. 
24; Protocol No. 6 of the Baku fair committee, undated (end of July 1922) // SUITA. F. 
735. Op. 1. D. 493. L. 15 and ARDA. F. 349. Op. 1. D. 24. L. 9-10.
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simply too much uncertainty regarding the rules of the game established by 
the Soviets: commercial privileges promised to fair participants had been 
constantly modified, canceled, then restored again, and the list of goods 
they were allowed to export or import constantly changed.37 Iranian trad-
ers were also frustrated by the strict regulations of currency transactions 
imposed by the Soviet side, in stark contrast to the overly liberal policies 
of the imperial government. Soviet experts agreed that political volatility 
had played its role in the fiasco of the fair, but put the main blame on the 
ongoing civil war in Anatolia that prevented Turkish and European goods 
from being part of the fair.38 Uncertainty and distrust thus had both domestic 
and foreign origins. 
Fig. 1. Growth of the trading volume at the Baku fair, 1922−1929.39
37 Such were the factors mentioned by the Iranian diplomatic representation in Azerbai-
jan in a letter to the Transcaucasian Foreign Ministry, along with problems of arbitrary 
confiscations and detainments at the border. See SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. D. 292. L. 27. 
38 Letter from the NKVT ZSFSR to Slavin, December 19, 1922 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 
1. D. 292. L. 3. 
39 Sources: VSNKh SSSR o Bakinskoi iarmarke // Bakinskii Rabochii. 1925. February 
13. No. 34 (1356). P. 4; S. Zelenskii. Perspektivy shestoi Bakinskoi iarmarki  // Eko-
nomicheskii vestnik Zakavkaz’ia. 1927. February 15. No. 4. Pp. 45-50; Novye zadachi 
Bakinskoi iarmarki // Zaria Vostoka. 1927. December 30. No. 1665. P. 1; Bakinskaia 
iarmarka 1927 goda. Otchet komiteta. Baku, 1927; Ümum şuralar ittifakı yarmarkasının 
növbəti məsələləri // Iktisadi Habərlər. 1929. No. 1 (119); Zakrylas’ VII-aia Bakinskaia 
iarmarka // Bakinskii Rabochii. 1929. April 16. No. 87 (2951). P. 1.
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“A carrier of socialist ideas…”
Enjoying the full support of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, the fair 
organizers did not give up after the initial fiasco, and subsequent annual 
fairs proved to be increasingly successful. The trade volume grew from 4.8 
million rubles in 1923 to 16.1 million rubles in 1925 and 31.2 million in 
1927 (fig. 1).40 The fair accounted for 9 percent of total Soviet trade with 
Iran in 1924, but 27 percent by 1927, which is even more remarkable given 
the upsurge of bilateral trade. The fair was instrumental in restoring the pre-
war level of Russian exports to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. At the same 
time, it was a major international venue for cross-cultural contacts and for 
spreading political influence. Azerbaijani politicians, who vied for autonomy 
within the Transcaucasian Federation and for leadership among the Muslim 
peoples of the Soviet Union at large, were keen on developing links with 
the Middle East, as it raised their international profile and provided them 
with political resources. With the onset of the policy of “affirmative action 
empire” in the early 1920s, Baku became a showcase for the transforma-
tion of the “Soviet East” and the flagman for the Turkic peoples, even those 
from regions with rich Muslim cultural traditions such as Crimea or the 
Tatar Autonomous Republic. After serving as a venue for the Congress of 
the Peoples of the East in September 1920, Baku gained a new role as the 
politics of the export of revolution gave way to the stake on compromise 
with Reza Khan’s regime in Iran, and the peaceful expansion of the Soviet 
sphere of influence.41 Baku assumed the role as political and cultural nexus 
for projecting Soviet sway to the Middle East. The Azerbaijani government 
was instrumental in setting up the First Turcological Congress in Baku on 
December 29–30, 1926, gathering scholars from all Turkic republics of the 
Soviet Union, as well as from Turkey, Iran, and Europe.42 The congress 
40 Official Soviet sources on the fair contain numerous discrepancies in figures, which 
are sometimes impossible to reconcile. Cross-checking and comparisons have allowed 
the identification of the most plausible figures. 
41 Oliver Bast. The Council for International Propaganda and the Establishment of the 
Iranian Communist Party // Touraj Atabaki (Ed.). Iran and the First World War. Pp. 163-
180; Solmaz Rüstəmova-Tohidi. Komintərnin Şərq siyasəti və Iran 1919−1943. Baku, 
2001. Pp. 105-141; Cosroe Chaqueri. Communism in Iran to 1941 // Encyclopaedia 
Iranica. 1993. Vol. VI. Fasc. 1. Pp. 95-102. 
42 Türk Dil Kurumu. 1926 Bakû türkoloji kongresinin 70. yıl dönümü toplantısı (29−30 
kasım 1996). Ankara, 1999; Andreas Frings. Playing off Moscow against Kazan. Azer-
baijan Maneuvering to Latinization in the Soviet Union // Ab Imperio. 2009. No. 4. Pp. 
249-316. 
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participants discussed not only themes related to Soviet republics but also 
the reforms under way in Turkey at that time, and, to a lesser extent, Iran. 
The congress became a major international event in the region, proving the 
rising transnational influence of the Soviet Union in general, and Soviet 
Azerbaijan in particular.
The Baku fair also functioned as a transborder institution, catering to both 
the Soviet and the Iranian public.43 By personally patronizing the fair, Azer-
baijan leaders such as Narimanov, Musabekov, and Agamaly Ogly assumed 
the role of important middlemen in Soviet−Iranian relations. They controlled 
what Musabekov called the “bridgehead to the East,” an exemplary model 
of exercising Soviet soft power.44 The political and cultural aspects of the 
fair were particularly important. The claim of Azerbaijan to a privileged 
position in shaping Soviet foreign policy toward Iran was substantiated by 
its claim to special expertise rooted in cultural and historical proximity.45 
At the same time, the leadership of Azerbaijan used the fair to demonstrate 
and promote the republic’s achievements to its neighbors engaged in similar 
modernizing processes: Turkey under Mustafa Kemal and Iran under Reza 
Khan.46 Mass attendance at the fair offered a unique opportunity for broad 
popularization of Azerbaijan’s quite favorable results in comparison with 
other participating countries, and the permanent presence of Turkish and 
Iranian consular agents at the fair testified to its importance. The fair was 
also a “site of knowledge,” where economic and also political and admin-
43 Cavanşir Vəkilov. Azərbaycan Respublikası və Iran. Baku, 1991. Pp. 8-20; N. A. 
Gasanov. Rol’ Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR v ustanovlenii i ukreplenii sovetsko-iranskikh 
otnoshenii / Avtoreferat dissertatsii. Baku, 1965. 
44 Otkrytie Bakinskoi iarmarki // Bakinskii Rabochii. 1923. 22 May. No. 111 (839). P. 
4. For a general discussion of the cultural and political role of exhibitions in the Soviet 
Union, see Francine Hirsch. Getting to Know “The Peoples of the USSR”: Ethnographic 
Exhibits as Soviet Virtual Tourism, 1923−1934 // Slavic Review. 2003. Vol. 62. No. 4. 
Pp. 683-709. 
45 Report of Pietro Quaroni to the Italian embassy in Moscow, September 3, 1926 // 
Archivio Storio Diplomatico (Archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry, ASMAE). Affari 
Politici 1919−1930. B. 1546. 
46 For this trilateral modernizing space, see Celal Metin. Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme. 
Türk Modernleşmesi ve Iran (1800−1941). Ankara, 2011. Pp. 287-308; Adeeb Khalid. 
Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative 
Perspective // Slavic Review. 2006. Vol. 65. No. 2. Pp. 231-251; François Georgeon. 
Kémalisme et monde musulman 1919−1938. Quelques points de repère // Cahiers du 
GETC. 1987. No. 3. Pp. 1-38; more generally on mutual influences in the period, see 
Stefan Plaggenborg. Ordnung und Gewalt. Kemalismus-Faschismus-Sozialismus. Mu-
nich, 2012. Pp. 21-68. 
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istrative “know how” were exchanged.47 This was all the more the case as 
foreign observers were aware that the Bolsheviks used the fair as a cultural 
and political lever in the East. 
The leaders of Azerbaijan thus had an objective interest in maintaining 
and intensifying cross-border relations with Northern Iran to shore up their 
own position. The numbers of Iranian companies represented at the fair 
jumped from 38 in 1924 to 121 in 1925, 155 in 1926, and 226 in 1927.48 
The geographical distribution of these companies clearly reflected the pat-
tern of regional economic ties running across the border of Azerbaijan. In 
1927, a third of the Iranian companies represented at the fair were based 
in Baku and carried cross-border trade with Iranian ports on the Caspian. 
The majority of other merchants (63 percent) came from the three border 
provinces of Iranian Azerbaijan, Gilan, and Mazandaran.49 The total number 
of Iranians working for these companies and present at the fair must have 
been notably higher, although we lack the exact statistics. These merchants 
were directly involved in the general functioning of the fair through a rep-
resentative assembly.50 Iranian participants in the fair would also mingle 
with local Iranian workers employed at railways and warehouses. Vladimir 
Osetrov (publishing under the pen name Irandust), a leading Soviet expert 
on the Middle East at the time, estimated the number of Iranian citizens in 
Baku at the time at approximately 23,000.51 The fair was the high point for 
several overlapping transnational networks. At the time of the fair, local 
Iranian charities often called special sessions, cultural associations met, and 
Iranian consular officials organized reunions of merchants and workers to 
discuss general problems of the migrants’ life.52 
47 On this concept, see Christian Jacob. Introduction: Faire corps, faire lieu // Christian 
Jacob (Ed.). Lieux de savoir. T. 1: Espaces et communautés. Paris, 2007. Pp. 17-42; for 
the significance of fairs and exhibitions for Russia, see Mirjam Voerkelius. Russland und 
die Sowjetunion auf den Weltausstellungen // Martin Aust (Ed.). Globalisierung imperial 
und sozialistisch. Russland und die Sowjetunion in der Globalgeschichte 1851−1911. 
Frankfurt and New York, 2013. Pp. 215-218.
48 Sed’maia Bakinskaia iarmarka // Zaria Vostoka. 1929. 10 March. No. 56 (2024). P. 1. 
49 Bakinskaia iarmarka 1927 g. Otchet komiteta. Baku, 1927. Pp. 11-12. 
50 Temporary Statute of the Baku trade fair, undated (December 1925) // SUITA. F. 617. 
Op. 1. D. 463. L. 37. 
51 Quoted by Touraj Atabaki. Disgruntled Guests: Iranian Subaltern on the Margins of the 
Tsarist Empire // International Review of Social History. 2003. Vol. 48. P. 415. 
52 Iran mədəni məarif cəmiyyətinin açılışı // Kommunist. 1929. 31 March. No. 73 (2579). 
P. 4; for an overview of Iranian charitable initiatives in Baku, see Nizâm’alî Dihnawî. 
Irâniân mohâjir dar Qafqâz. Teheran, 1383 (2004). Pp. 31-45. 
92
Etienne Forestier-Peyrat, Red Passage to Iran
The thrust of the propaganda employed by the Azerbaijani organizers of 
the fair reflected their preoccupation with its transnational dimension. Soviet 
Azerbaijan was presented as a gatekeeper between the Soviet Union and 
Eastern countries, as in the documentary movie shot in 1925, laconically 
titled “The Baku Fair Trade.”53 The newly established Azerbaijani Photo-
Cinematographic Administration was entrusted with producing the movie, 
whose script was written by a certain A. Gasparian. This film, unfortunately 
lost, apparently focused on the intercultural dimension of the fair. Trade was 
interpreted as a vehicle for strengthening international solidarity between 
the Soviet and Oriental peoples, and for overcoming state borders. Scenes 
shot during the fair were combined with frames from Turkey, Iran, and 
Germany, to provide an international comparison. Along with meetings, 
shows, exhibitions, and leaflets, the movie was another instrument of cul-
tural and propagandist influence exerted upon Iranian merchants during the 
fair. The fair effectively served as a conveyor of socialist ideas to Eastern 
merchants and fitted the general strategy of Soviet diplomats in Iran to court 
merchants as a progressive and nationalist fringe in Iranian society. Trade 
with the Soviet Caucasus enhanced their social and economic stance, and 
would ultimately promote Soviet interests in the country.54
The growing importance of the fair was underscored by the construction 
of a new building, which physically came to embody the multiple worlds 
alleged to meet in Baku under the Soviet tutelage. Azerbaijani leaders 
developed ambitious plans after the 1924 fair, justifying their increased ap-
petites by the more favorable conditions enjoyed by the Nizhny Novgorod 
fair, its main rival. This fair was held on a magnificent compound, in “tra-
ditional” Russian style, the legacy of its glorious prerevolutionary past.55 In 
November 1925, the ZSFSR mission in Moscow submitted a request to the 
union government to fund the construction project, since the fair enjoyed 
the “All-Union status.”56 Around 900,000 rubles were eventually spent on 
53 Information about this film is limited to a few lines in M. Z. Rzaeva. Dokumental’noe 
kino Azerbaiidzhana, 1920−1965. Baku, 1971. P. 33. Rzaeva bases her study on the film 
archives of Azerbaijan. 
54 Circular letter of the Soviet ambassador in Iran, Boris Shumiatskii, to Soviet consuls and 
Caucasian authorities, September 10, 1924 // Sak’artvelos shinagan sakmeta saministros 
ark’ivi, Partiuli ark’ivi (Archive of the Georgian Interior Ministry, Party Archive // SSSA-
PA). F. 13. Op. 2. D. 258. Ll. 1-4. 
55 On the Nizhegorod Fair, see Anne Lincoln Fitzpatrick. The Great Russian Fair – Nizhny 
Novgorod, 1840−1890. New York, 1990. 
56 Letter from the Transcaucasian Sovnarkom to the Transcaucasian mission in Moscow, 
October 31, 1925 // SUITA. F. 617. Op. 1. D. 463. L. 27. 
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the four-building complex that was completed by April 1926, just in time to 
welcome the fifth annual fair. A correspondent of the Baku Worker properly 
acknowledged the multicultural symbolism of the building: 
The complex generally conforms to Oriental style, somewhere in-
between Iranian and Byzantine styles. The main building features a 
covered gallery with a grand central staircase. It is flanked by booths, 
150 in all, for shops and merchants. The building has a main yard and 
two lateral ones. The central yard is in Byzantine style, the second in 
Arabic style, and the third in Iranian style. Impressive columns sur-
round each yard. A fountain and a big bust of Lenin stand in the middle 
of the main yard.57 
This syncretism illustrated the complex mental map that framed the 
perception of the fair by the Azerbaijani leaders and the architect, at the 
crossroads of the Middle East and European Russia.58 Oriental symbolism 
coexisted with the modern facilities, such as electricity or tramway. The new 
building, in this vision, embodied the longtime investment of Azerbaijani 
leaders in the Baku fair as a cross-border phenomenon.59
Reshaping foreign trade in the Azerbaijan borderland
Communist leaders, however, not only added ideological and political 
dimensions to the traditional commercial networks connecting the South 
Caucasus and Northern Iran. The Soviet economic policies shaped by them 
actually began transforming those networks and the economic geography of 
the region in general. Until 1926, this transformation was not quite visible 
yet. According to Soviet officials, the new forms of Soviet foreign trade with 
the East were aimed at mutual economic development on socialist principles, 
breaking with the previous Russian practices of capitalist exploitation. The 
Transcaucasian Commissar for Foreign Trade in 1923, Aram Ivanian, quali-
fied Soviet trade as “a powerful means for Eastern peoples to be emancipated 
57 Kak stroilos’ iarmarochnoe zdanie // Bakinskii rabochii. 1926. 30 April. No. 101 
(1723). P. 6. 
58 On the role of architecture in shaping borderland identities in the Russian context, see 
Kelly O’Neill. Constructing Russian Identity in the Imperial Borderland: Architecture, 
Islam, and the Transformation of the Crimean Landscape // Ab Imperio. 2006. No. 2. 
Pp. 163-192.
59 Letter from the Transcaucasian Commissar of Finances to the Sovnarkom ZSFSR, April 
4, 1927 // SUITA. F. 617. Op. 1. D. 1227. L. 30; the use of a supposedly traditional style 
was typical for world fairs. See Mirjam Voerkelius. Russland und die Sowjetunion auf 
den Weltausstellungen. Pp. 212-213. 
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from predatory capital.”60 Soviet theoreticians of foreign trade explained 
that the Soviet Union and its southern neighbors were not economic com-
petitors, since the former was on its way to become an industrial power, 
and the latter remained largely agricultural economies.61 In practice, this 
meant that traditional asymmetries in trade with Iran persisted, and to this 
end the cornerstone of Soviet foreign economic policy – the monopoly on 
trade by central government agencies – was bypassed in a rare exemption 
granted to the Baku fair. 
The exceptional advantages enjoyed by the Baku fair were instrumental 
in strengthening economic integration with Northern Iran. The numer-
ous benefits of the fair were outlined in special decrees by the Councils of 
People’s Commissars at the three levels involved (the USSR, ZSFSR, and 
Azerbaijan), and the Moscow-based Council of Labor and Defense (STO) 
in charge of coordinating economic and strategic military planning. Those 
benefits fell into two categories: (1) the right to import or export goods during 
the fair without obtaining special licenses and beyond regular quotas, and (2) 
reduced tariffs for water and railway transportation, storage, and insurance. 
Comprehensive lists of products covered by these exemptions were circu-
lated before the fair. In 1924, for instance, cotton, silk, dried fruit, rice, furs, 
and livestock could be imported into the USSR without quota. Conversely, 
salt, flour, tea, timber, paper, dyestuffs, medicines, china, glass, textiles, 
and soap were allowed unrestricted export across the Azerbaijani border.62 
Eastern countries were expected to provide raw materials and buy Soviet 
agricultural and manufactured goods. Although some Soviet economists 
criticized these exclusive advantages enjoyed by the Baku fair (their argu-
ments resembled those employed by eighteenth-century free-traders against 
fairs in ancien régime Europe), these measures served as major incentives 
for Iranian merchants, who were suspicious of Soviet ideology and politics. 
These extraordinary measures kept cross-border ties alive, as Soviet diplo-
mats emphasized in their correspondence with the Iranian Foreign Ministry.63
The Baku fair was also criticized on more general grounds, both inside 
and outside Transcaucasia. Sergei Malyshev, head of the Nizhny Novgorod 
60 Letter from Ivanian to the Sovnarkom ZSFSR, March 8, 1923 // SUITA. F. 735. Op.1. 
D. 292. L. 6. 
61 Entsiklopediia sovetskogo eksporta. Berlin, 1928. Pp. 34-35. 
62 Decree No. 70 of the All-Union NKVT, April 24, 1924. Pp. 21-23, reprinted in Vladimir 
Serov. Spravochnik Bakinskoi iarmarki. Pp. 21-23. 
63 Telegram from Chicherin to Shumiatskii, April 11, 1925 // I. K. Kobliakov et al. (Eds.). 
Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. Vol. 8. Moscow, 1963. P. 227 and passim. 
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fair, objected to the popular thesis of Azerbaijani leaders that Baku was the 
“natural place” for a fair at the crossroads of East and West.64 Malyshev as-
serted the paramount importance of his own fair for the Soviet Union, and 
believed that all of the fiscal advantages and logistical support should be 
given solely to Nizhny Novgorod.65 Whereas Baku was trading mostly just 
with Northern Iran, the operations of the Nizhegorod fair had an all-Eurasian 
dimension, as documented by posters produced for the fair depicting people 
coming to Nizhny Novgorod from China, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Central 
Asia, Iran, and Turkey.66 Azerbaijani leaders dismissed these allegations 
as reeking of Great-Russian chauvinism, but had to enter into protracted 
negotiations in Tiflis and Moscow to preserve the privileges enjoyed by 
the Baku fair.
This was a tricky task, as Azerbaijan was trying simultaneously to secure 
privileges granted by the Union government, and to preclude its interference 
into the fair business. To keep Moscow at a distance, Azerbaijani leaders used 
their strong position in the government and party structures of the ZSFSR 
to play the card of defending Caucasian autonomy. Foreign trade had been 
the bone of contention between Moscow and border republics since the 
early 1920s, and now the ZSFSR allowed for more efficient lobbying of 
local interests.67 In late 1925, the All-Union NKVT developed a plan and 
submitted it to the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) to move the central 
management of the fair to Moscow.68 Transcaucasian leaders objected to 
the move, although they made a symbolic concession: “nominal manage-
ment” of the fair could be transferred to Moscow, but the actual “operational 
management” should remain in Tiflis and Baku.69 They ultimately blocked 
64 Protocol No. 28, Meeting of the Transcaucasian Gosplan, November 11, 1924 // SUITA. 
F. 617. Op. 1. D. 333. L. 15.
65 Sergei Malyshev. Protivnikam Nizhegorodskoi iarmarki. Nizhny Novgorod, 1925. 
Not everyone in the All-Union VSNKh agreed. See Nikolai Valentinov. Novaia eko-
nomicheskaia politika i krizis partii posle smerti Lenina. Stanford, 1971. Pp. 128-129. 
66 Sergei Malyshev. Nizhegorodskaia iarmarka 1925 goda (po materialam k dokladu 
pravitel’stvu). Nizhny Novgorod, 1925. Pp. 10-14.
67 See, for example, a letter from Stalin to Lenin, September 22, 1922, on federal eco-
nomic relations: RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 28. Ll. 19-21, quoted in L. S. Gatagova, L. P. 
Kosheleva, and L. A. Rogovaia (Eds.). TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b) i natsional’nyi vopros. Vol. 
1: 1918−1933. Moscow, 2005. Pp. 78-79. 
68 Letter from the Transcaucasian mission in Moscow to the Economic Council of ZSFSR, 
November 19, 1925 // SUITA. F. 617. Op. 1. D. 463. L. 30. 
69 Temporary Statute of the Baku fair, undated (December 1925) // SUITA. F. 617. Op. 
1. D. 463. L. 36-37. 
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the most centralizing aspects of the plan and reasserted the Transcaucasian 
character of the fair.70
The reality was far from this claim: the economic exchanges with North-
ern Iran through the Baku fair remained mostly the business of Azerbaijan, 
and were not really supported by other Caucasian economic actors. The 
organizers of the fair bitterly complained about a lack of interest in the fair 
in Georgia and Armenia. A correspondent for the Baku Worker was very 
critical of the booth organized that year by the Georgian Supreme Economic 
Council (VSNKh): 
The boss tells wholesale customers: “We do not practice wholesale 
trade, we sell goods at reduced prices to retail customers.” However, 
anyone who wants to buy goods in small quantities is told that the boss 
is not there or that prices have not been set yet. […] Privately, the boss 
confesses he is not at all interested in business. Up to now, one has to 
admit he has been admirably true to his word.71
In 1922, alarming telegrams were dispatched by the Transcaucasian 
NKVT to Armenia, calling on the republic “to take an active part in the fair.”72 
But Armenian government agencies and private merchants were particularly 
reluctant to participate in the fair. They relied on their own networks of Ira-
nian and Iranian-Armenian merchants that formed a different commercial 
geography. Through the border city of Julfa, they extended their operations 
to Western Iranian Azerbaijan. In 1922, Transcaucasian companies accounted 
for only 11 percent of all traders at the fair, and less than 1 percent in 1924. 
By contrast, Iranian merchants and companies made up 46.1 percent of all 
the fair participants (the share of Azerbaijan was 20.9 percent, of Ukraine 
15.8 percent, and of the faraway Ural region 4.4 percent).73 Attempts by 
the Transcaucasian authorities to encourage or compel Georgian and Arme-
nian agencies and companies to actively participate in the Baku fair had a 
negligible effect.74 On the other hand, compared to the possibility of direct 
70 See correspondence from January−February 1926 between Transcaucasian and central 
organs: SUITA. F. 617. Op. 1. D. 463. L. 61-62 and 91 in particular.
71 Magazin VSNKh Gruzii // Bakinskii Rabochii. 1922. 20 October. No. 236 (668). P. 1. 
72 Letter from Virap, member of the Zakvneshtorg’s college, to Lukashin, chairman of the 
Armenian Sovnarkom, August 10, 1922. No. 10524 // SUITA. F. 735. Op. 1. D. 294. L. 4. 
73 ARDA. F. 133. Op. 1. D. 32. L. 64, quoted in Q. H. Bünyadov. Bərpa dövründə, 1971. 
P. 106. 
74 See an example of such attempts in 1927 in the correspondence between the Trans-
caucasian Sovnarkom and the Central Executive Committee in January−February 1927: 
SUITA. F. 617. Op. 1. D. 1822. Ll. 1-2. 
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competition, the Baku fair organizers may have viewed this passiveness as 
the lesser evil. Thus, the Georgian government cherished plans to launch 
its own international economic initiative in 1926.75
As the above numbers indicate, besides administrative control and 
political rivalries, the fair depended very much on the attitudes of its most 
numerous group of participants − Iranian merchants. They developed skills 
in using the complex geography of economic networks structured around 
the fair to outwit the restrictions set by the Soviet state. All border customs 
houses in Transcaucasia had to seal goods sent to the fair, and the import 
dues were to be paid on a special tariff only when they reached the prem-
ises of the fair. This physical disconnection of the border and the customs 
control created opportunities for fraud and contraband. Some commodities 
earmarked for the fair disappeared en route, together with accompanying 
personnel. Contraband was not necessarily planned beforehand, but could 
be an impromptu reaction to the unexpectedly changed fiscal rules. In June 
1923, a group of Iranian merchants stood trial in Baku. They took part in 
the Baku fair in 1922, but were disappointed by the recall of some previ-
ously announced discounts in export tariffs, and decided to secretly move 
the goods they had bought out of the country. They were caught by border 
guards while trying to smuggle their merchandise on an Iranian boat. Sen-
tenced to long prison terms, they were eventually pardoned and expelled 
to Iran in July by the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan (out of 
political and diplomatic considerations).76 This case demonstrated the in-
ternal political divide between the authorities of Azerbaijan, allied with the 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, and the Transcaucasian 
Cheka (political police) acting alongside the Moscow-based trade organs, 
on the other. This split revealed deep disagreements as to the way border 
interactions should evolve in the future. 
Iranian traders frequently complained about the legal and economic 
insecurity of their operations in the Soviet Union.77 Financial problems 
topped their list of grievances. Small and mid-sized Iranian traders badly 
75 An attempt to establish an agricultural exhibition in Tiflis was seen by Azerbaijani 
leaders as a challenge to the Baku fair. Podgotovka k Bakinskoi iarmarke // Bakinskii 
Rabochii. 1926. 25 January. No. 21 (1643). P. 3.
76 Iz zaly suda // Bakinskii Rabochii.1923. 15 June. No. 131 (859). P. 5; Iz zaly suda // 
Bakinskii Rabochii. 1923. 24 June. No. 138 (866). P. 5; Pomilovanie persidskikh kuptsov 
// Bakinskii Rabochii. 1923. 12 July. No. 156 (882). P. 5.
77 Anonymous Polish consular official, “Kraj Zakaukaski w roku 1926,” undated (spring 
1927), in Andrzej Furier. Kraj Zakaukaski w relacjach dyplomatów II Rzeczypospolitej. 
Poznań, 1998. P. 111. 
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needed credit to support their operations.78 Credit could be provided only by 
the Soviet institutions that had offices in Baku and other Soviet and Iranian 
towns. The Soviet State Bank (Gosbank) was by far the most important 
actor on this credit market.79 In September 1923, the joint Soviet−Iranian 
bank Ruspersbank was established by a bilateral agreement, at the request of 
the Soviet ambassador in Tehran, Shumiatskii.80 Ruspersbank had branches 
in all major cities of Northern Iran, considerably facilitating cross-border 
trade. The cross-border operations and joint-stock composition of these 
banks blurred the distinctions between domestic and foreign trade, con-
tributing to the economic fluidity of the border. Still, the insufficient access 
to economic information and the shaky status of the Soviet currency with 
its fluctuations and limited convertibility (in comparison with the solid 
reputation of the tsarist ruble) hampered the bridging of both Soviet and 
Iranian Azerbaijan into a common credit sphere. The Soviet regime sus-
tained control over currency exchange and restricted transfers of cash by 
foreign workers and merchants. Influenced by Marxist economic theory, 
Soviet economic and juridical authorizes perceived even insignificant 
operations with currency and precious metals in terms of “trafficking of 
gold” and “speculation.”81 The implementation of restrictive measures went 
hand in hand with the centralization of currency emission and abolition of 
the republican and Transcaucasian pegged currencies in 1923−24.82 Party 
leaders of Azerbaijan apparently tried to delay the implementation of some 
of these measures around 1924, arguing that the “special circumstances” 
of border regions justified a more flexible approach. The Transcaucasian 
Party Committee, however, sided with Moscow in this matter.83 Exemptions 
were retained only for the fair, and Eastern merchants enjoyed a special 
privilege to return home with up to 30 percent of their net profit at the fair 
in hard currency, but many of them complained that customs officers in 
Baku, Julfa, and Astara refused to recognize this allowance, which caused 
78 Yarmarqa ve qredit meseleleri // Kommunist. 1924. 4 June. No. 122 (1122). P. 7. 
79 Protocol No. 54, Collegium of the NKVT ZSFSR, April 17, 1923 // SUITA. F. 617. 
Op. 1. D. 182. L. 41-42. 
80 Organizatsiia i deiatel’nost’ sovetsko-persidskikh smeshannykh obshchestv. Baku, 
1925. Pp. 59-67. 
81 Protocol No. 48 of the Presidium of the Transcaucasian Party Committee’s (Zakkrai-
kom), December 12, 1922 // SSSA-PA. F. 13. Op. 1. D. 17. L. 85. 
82 Protocol No. 39 of the Presidium of the Zakkrajkom, February 22, 1924 // SSSA-PA. 
F. 13. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 14-15. 
83 Protocol No. 45 of the Presidium of the Zakkrajkom, March 19, 1924 // SSSA-PA. F. 
13. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 34-35. 
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lengthy deliberations.84 Obviously, the economic ties between Transcaucasia 
and Iran were never restored to their prewar level.
The 1926–1927 trade conflict and political mobilization 
in Northern Iran
The difficult process of restoring old economic ties was further troubled 
by the heightened bilateral tensions starting in late 1925, triggered by the 
chronic trade deficit between the USSR and Iran. The Soviet Union im-
ported numerous products from Iran, such as raw materials needed for its 
expanding manufacturing sector, above all cotton and skins, and also dried 
fruit, meat, live cattle, and so on. Soviet exports of sugar, flour, metals, and 
manufactured goods did not match imports. Soviet course of industrializa-
tion required sustaining the positive balance of foreign trade in order to 
provide the regime with much-needed hard currency.85 Even though trade 
with Eastern countries as a whole had plunged during World War I and the 
Civil War, its relative share in the Soviet foreign exchanges had increased 
compared to the levels of late tsarist Russia, from 6 percent before 1914 
to around 15 percent.86 At a session of the Politburo on January 11, 1926, 
Iranian trade was clearly identified as one of the key resources for reducing 
the foreign trade deficit.87
On January 31, 1926, the Soviet government and the Soviet legation to 
Iran announced that the border was closed to Iranian imports, except cot-
ton and wool, in order to reduce the bilateral trade deficit.88 This economic 
embargo was to be maintained until a new trade agreement could be reached, 
with had tremendous consequences for the economy of Northern Iran. In 
84 Protocol No. 7 of the Transcaucasian Sovnarkom, June 5, 1924 // SUITA. F. 617. Op. 
1. D. 247. L. 2; Letter from the Narkomfin RSFSR to the Commissariat of Foreign Af-
fairs (NKID), June 14, 1923 // SUITA. F. 617. Op. 1. D. 198. L. 22. 
85 David M. Woodruff. The Politburo on Gold, Industrialization, and the International 
Economy, 1925−1926 // Paul R. Gregory, Norman Naimark (Eds.). The Lost Politburo 
Transcripts. From Collective Rule to Stalin’s Dictatorship. New Haven, 2008. Pp. 214-
215.
86 Violet Conolly. Soviet Economic Policy in the East. Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Mon-
golia and Tana Tuva. Sin Kiang and London, 1933. P. 127. 
87 Minutes of the Politburo session on the situation and perspectives of the currency 
reserves, January 11, 1926 // K. M. Anderson. P. Gregory, O. V. Khlevniuk et al. (Eds.). 
Stenogrammy zasedanii Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b) 1923−1938 gg. Vol. 1: 
1923−1926. Moscow, 2007. P. 552. 
88 Sir Percy Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Teheran, January 30, 1926 // Public 
Record Office (PRO). FO 416/78. P. 44. 
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Gilan, Mazandaran, and Iranian Azerbaijan the economy was entirely de-
pendent on exports to the Soviet Union. The initial reaction to embargo was 
more bafflement than despair. By March 1926, discontent began to grow 
in the Northern and Central regions of the country.89 This discontent did 
not erupt into violent protests for a number of reasons. First, it was antici-
pated that the embargo would soon end, following an agreement between 
the Iranian and Soviet governments. Second, Soviet agencies continued to 
purchase, half-secretly, large quantities of the officially banned goods.90 
These purchases were a bargain for the USSR, as prices plummeted after the 
introduction of the embargo. Third, Soviet consular and commercial mis-
sions to Iran still issued licenses for participation in the Baku fair, although 
for limited amounts of merchandise, and with the commitment to purchase 
Soviet goods with the proceeds.91 Thus, the embargo did not completely cut 
off Northern Iran from the Soviet market.
Discontent was directed against both the Soviet and the Iranian govern-
ments, the latter seen as unable and unwilling to respond to the crisis. Rumors 
circulated that cotton and wool would soon be included in the embargo, 
which promised ruin to the Iranian peasants.92 Abdolhossein Teymourtash, 
the Iranian Court minister, set out for Moscow in summer 1926 to seek a 
solution to the problem, but the first report he submitted to the Majlis was 
met with hostility by members of Parliament and public opinion.93 Border 
regions and Caspian ports abounded with stories about Iranian merchants 
being imprisoned during and after the Baku fair under minor pretexts, al-
legedly for illegally exporting currency or exchanging chervontsy (ten-ruble 
bills) on the black market. A series of arrests and expulsions of Iranian 
89 Sir P. Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Tehran, February 22, 1926 // PRO. FO 416/78. 
Pp. 114-115; Sir P. Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Tehran, March 11, 1926 // PRO. 
FO 416/78. P. 128. 
90 Sir P. Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Tehran, April 22, 1926 // PRO. FO 416/78. 
P. 152. 
91 Only 10 percent of the total volume of trade could be brought back in hard currency to 
Iran, the rest had to be in Soviet products. Sir Percy Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 
Teheran, May 18, 1926 // PRO. FO 416/78. Pp. 176-178. Iranian merchants complained 
thereafter that even these harsh conditions were not respected. See Sir Percy Loraine to 
Sir Austen Chamberlain, Teheran, June 15, 1926 // PRO. FO 416/79. P. 15. 
92 Mr. Nicolson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Gulhek, November 20, 1926 // PRO. FO 
416/79. P. 188; Mr. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Tehran, November 20, 1926 // 
PRO. FO 416/79. P. 200. 
93 Mr. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Teheran, December 2, 1926 // PRO. FO 416/79. 
P. 204.
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subjects by the Transcaucasian Cheka actually took place in late 1925–early 
1926. They provoked energetic protests from the Commissariat of Foreign 
Affairs, so the Transcaucasian Party Committee decided to suspend mass 
expulsions of Iranian citizens, except for the “criminal elements.”94 As a 
British diplomat in Iran noted, rumors about these abuses stirred mass in-
dignation. The press of Northern Iran closely followed the fate of arrested 
merchants and blamed both the Iranian government for its inactivity and the 
Soviets for their treacherous policy.95 As far as the Iranian government was 
concerned, this criticism was relatively unfair. Iranian diplomatic documents 
reveal the unflinching, even if discrete, commitment of Iranian diplomats 
and consuls, notably in Baku, to obtain the release of Iranian subjects and 
support their legal claims.96
Iranian merchants politically organized themselves in Gilan, in January–
February 1927, when they founded a Jem’iyet-e nehzet-e eqtesâdî (literally 
Society for Economic Revival, commonly translated as Gilan Merchants’ 
Economic Union). This Union relied on the tradition of merchant revolts 
since the Tobacco Protest of 1891−92. The Tobacco Protest, a response to 
the concession granted by Nasir al-Din Shah to British citizen Julius de 
Reuter, was a milestone in the history of political protest in Iran.97 However, 
the Economic Union of Gilan not only took up nationalist slogans against 
foreign humiliation. Implicitly, it aimed at maintaining regional economic 
transborder ties, countering the mounting Soviet obstacles to it. In a way, 
it defended common regional cross-border interests against intervention 
from Moscow. This subtext of the Union’s activity was acknowledged by 
the Iranian ambassador in Moscow in a private talk with the Italian ambas-
sador.98 The first decision of the Union was to boycott the Baku trade fair, 
where Iranian merchants formerly played the leading role. The Economic 
Union lobbied the Majlis, Iranian government, and Reza Shah himself. 
They promptly sent emissaries to meet with the prime minister, Mostowfi 
94 Decision of the presidium of the Zakkrajkom, January 16, 1926 // Osobaia Papka. 
SSSA-PA. F. 1. Op. 1. D.1. L. 3. 
95 Mr. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Teheran, December 30, 1926 // PRO. FO 416/80. 
P. 17. 
96 Mahmud Tâherahmadi. Ravâbit-e Irân. Pp. 152-153. 
97 Nikki R. Keddie. Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891−1892. 
London, 1966; Mansoor Moaddel. Shi’i Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in 
the Tobacco Movement of 1890−1892 // John Foran (Ed.). A Century of Revolution. 
Social Movements in Iran. London, 1994. Pp. 1-20. 
98 Telegram of the Italian embassy in Moscow to the Italian Foreign Ministry, March 23, 
1927 // ASMAE. Affari Politici, 1919−1930. B. 1548 (Russia). 
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ol-Mamâlek, to exact a fair commercial agreement or countermeasures.99 A 
new mission was sent to Moscow on March 19, headed by the then Foreign 
Minister Ali Qoli Ansari. 
The rise of this popular movement in Northern Iran came as a surprise to 
the Soviets. The main centers of the movement were in Resht and the port 
of Pehlevi (formerly, Enzeli). Police reports emphasized the efficiency of 
the movement to mobilize masses under anti-Soviet slogans, and occasional 
criticism of the government’s passivity. On March 14, 1927, for instance, 
3,000 people participated in a meeting at the Shâh Hâzer mosque in Resht, 
before marching to the telegraph house and sending a telegram to the Ma-
jlis.100 At the end of March, the Economic Union increased its demands 
and threatened to take control of customs in Enzeli and all border posts in 
Gilan. The Interior Ministry received instructions to prevent this step, which 
would hurt the “dignity of the State” (heysiyat-e dowlat) and credibility in 
the eyes of the USSR.101 The Economic Union protested and reminded the 
government that it had always been moderate in its claims, and was only 
pushed to action by despair and the government’s inactivity.102 An ultima-
tum was drafted on May 2, after a meeting held in Resht on April 20, 1927, 
to which all heads of Gilani administrations had been invited. On May 3, 
Reshti merchants marched on Pehlevi with several hundred supporters and 
besieged the customs house, provoking panic among Soviet commercial 
representatives. Only due to the governor’s intervention and a noticeable 
military presence were the merchants talked into returning to Resht.103 The 
speeches made in Pehlevi by the leaders of the movement denounced Soviet 
economic exploitation and the restrictions on Iranian trade. The Baku fair, 
which had opened on January 25 and closed on March 25, was repeatedly 
99 Ettelâ’ât. 5 Esfand 1305 (25 February 1927). No. 162. P. 2. 
100 Letter from the central department of gendarmerie (edâre-ye koll tashkilât-e nazmiye-
ye mamlakati) to Mostowfi ol-Mamâlek, 7 farvardin 1306 (28 March 1927), published in 
Mahmud Tâherahmadi. Asnâd-e ravâbit-e Irân o Shuravî dar dowre Rezâ Shâh. Tehran, 
1996. P. 76. 
101 Letter from the North-Western directorate at the Interior Ministry to the Gilan ad-
ministration, 24 farvardin 1306 (14 April 1927), in Mahmud Tâherahmadi. Asnâd-e 
ravâbit-e Irân. P. 77; Sir R. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain, April 23, 1927 // PRO. 
FO 416/80. P. 170. 
102 Telegrams (22 and 23 farvardin 1306) of April 12 and 13, 1927, from the Economic 
Union to Mostowfi ol-Mamâlek, in Mahmud Tâherahmadi. Asnâd-e ravâbit-e Irân. Pp. 
80-81. 
103 Report fom the governor of Gilan to the Interior Minister, Imad os-Saltane, 12 ordibe-
hesht 1306 (May 3, 1927), in Mahmud Tâherahmadi. Asnâd-e ravâbit-e Irân. Pp. 91-93.
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mentioned in the speeches and discussed in the local newspaper Parvaresh, 
edited by Hoseyn Iqbâl and Hoseyn Râzâni. 
Observers on the Soviet side had no doubt that this protest movement 
was organized by the British seeking to put Northern Iran under their control 
and reduce to nil Soviet economic and political influence in the country.104 
On January 17, 1927, the Baku-based journal Kommunist featured a lengthy 
article on “Soviet-Iranian relations,” which singled out British propaganda 
as the main source of the brewing discontent in Northern Iran.105 The Brit-
ish, it was purported, had struck an alliance with rich merchants, which 
prevented any agreement in the trade dispute. The article alleged instances 
of violence against Soviet citizens, including Transcaucasian agents in Resht 
and Pehlevi. Articles on the topic published in Transcaucasian newspapers 
contributed to the general atmosphere of the “war scare” of 1927.106 As 
protests spread in Gilan, the Soviet ambassador Konstantin Yurenev com-
plained in a diplomatic note about the prevalence of an anti-Soviet mood, 
and reported incidents involving Soviet ships in Pehlevi.107 Locally, Soviet 
consuls were asked to soothe provincial authorities and convince them to 
take a more favorable stance vis-à-vis the Soviets. These attempts must 
have been somewhat effective because the 1927 fair was a success. Despite 
the boycott movement, Gilan merchants showed more enthusiasm about 
attending the fair than their peers from other provinces: they purchased 
35 percent of all the licenses for the Baku fair sold in Iran (while only 22 
percent were purchased in Iranian Azerbaijan, 20 percent in Khorasan, and 
8 percent in Mazandaran).108
The protest movement of Gilani merchants, in retrospect, was a twofold 
failure. In the short run, it was not strong enough to block trade between 
Northern Iran and Russia and thus strengthen the bargaining power of Iran. 
In the longer run, it contributed to the tapering off of economic connections 
104 S. Zelenskii. Shestaia Bakinskaia iarmarka i persidskii rynok // Ekonomicheskii Vestnik 
Zakavkaz’iia. 1927. No. 8. 15 April. Pp. 78-79. 
105 Shuralar-Iran münasibeti // Kommunist. 1927. 17 January. No. 13 (1910). P. 1. 
106 John P. Sontag. The Soviet War Scare of 1926−27 // Russian Review. 1975. Vol. 
34. No. 1. Pp. 66-77; Raymond W. Leonard. Secret Soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet 
Military Intelligence, 1918−1933. Westport, 1999. Pp. 86-88; Anna di Biagio. Moscow, 
the Comintern, and the War Scare, 1926−1928 // Silvio Pons, Andrea Romano (Eds.). 
Russia in the Age of War, 1914−1945. Milano, 2000. Pp. 83-102. 
107 Verbal note from Yurenev to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, March 7, 1927 // Dokumenty 
vneshnei politiki SSSR. Vol. 10. Moscow, 1965. Pp. 74-75. 
108 See SUITA. F. 617. Op. 1. D. 1227. Ll. 5-22; Bakinskaia iarmarka 1927 g. Otchet 
komiteta. Baku, 1927. Pp. 6-8. 
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between Northern Iran and the South Caucasus. The trade treaty between 
Iran and the USSR was finally signed on October 1, 1927, in Moscow. The 
terms of the treaty meticulously regulated commercial transactions between 
the two countries, which significantly reduced the autonomy of regional ac-
tors in the borderland. The underlying principle of trade relationships was 
proclaimed the “balance of contract” (netto balans), an equilibrium between 
exports and imports. Iranian exports to Russia should amount to 250 million 
kran (50 million rubles), of which 150 should be in raw materials, and 100, 
in food products.109 A similar amount was allotted for Iranian imports. The 
balance of trade was to be distributed equally between Iranian merchants 
and Soviet government-controlled traders. As Hoseyn Navaï remarked in 
1935, the treaty aimed at eliminating the deficit, even at a cost of reducing 
the volume of trade.110 Indeed, the Soviets managed almost to eliminate 
their deficit: in 1927−28, Iran exported goods worth 209 million kran and 
imported goods worth 199 million kran.111 This efficient regulation of the 
trade balance was achieved at the expense of restricting regional economic 
autonomy, with grave consequences for the Baku fair. 
The end of the fair and the unmaking of the Azerbaijani borderland
The future of the Baku fair was publicly questioned even before the 
signing of the treaty of 1927. On July 6, 1927, David Zavriev, the academic 
secretary of the Transcaucasian-Eastern Chamber of Commerce (ZVTP), in 
an article titled “The Council of Industrial Congresses of the USSR and the 
Baku Fair,” reported on a session of this association of industry and trade 
lobbyists held in Moscow in late May. Anticipating a trade treaty with Iran 
soon, representatives of the largest state-owned companies had agreed that 
the Baku fair was an outdated relic of the bygone epoch of unregulated 
commerce.112 Zavriev himself held a different view. He admitted that other 
channels might be more efficient than the Baku fair for the bilateral exchange 
109 Miron Rezun. The Soviet Union and Iran. Soviet Policy in Iran from the Beginnings 
of the Pahlavi Dynasty until the Soviet Invasion in 1941. Geneva and Alphen aan den 
Rijn, 1981. Pp. 116-119. 
110 Hossein Navaï. Les relations économiques irano-russes. Paris, 1935. Pp. 123-125. A 
few years later, a secret report of the Party Control Commission would criticize the netto 
balans as relatively unproductive and fraught with unforeseen consequences. SUITA. F. 
616. Op. 1. D. 5. Ll. 138-142. 
111 Rezun. The Soviet Union and Iran. Pp. 211-212. 
112 D. Zavriev. Sovet s”ezdov promyshlennosti SSSR i Bakinskaia iarmarka // Zaria 
Vostoka. 1927. 6 July. No. 1519. P. 2. 
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of goods. He stated, however, that the fair had other important functions: it 
sustained borderland economic cooperation between the Southern Caucasus 
and Northern Iran, which was indispensable in stimulating the production 
of raw materials. It could also help in promoting Soviet exports to Southern 
Iran, thus expanding the economic sphere of influence of the Transcaucasia.113 
Other defenders of the fair, such as the anonymous author who signed an 
article on December 30, 1927, in the Dawn of the East, the official Trans-
caucasian newspaper, emphasized that the fair had not only a quantitative 
dimension of the net turnover of commodities but also a qualitative one. 
Within the system of the border economy, it maintained and developed 
personal networks, drawing economic views and cultural norms closer.114 
Criticisms of the fair were voiced against a backdrop of intensifying 
ideological conflict and political struggle within the Soviet leadership on 
issues of industrialization and trade.115 Left-leaning politicians and econo-
mists saw no place for trade fairs in the centrally managed economy of state 
socialism. Those considered “right-wing” in the Bolshevik establishment 
saw fiscal and economic advantages and fiscal exemptions granted to fairs 
as unjustified measures. They argued that having a local economic effect, 
fairs overburdened the national economy as a whole. Furthermore, fairs 
concentrated peak economic activity very disproportionately over a short 
period of time, putting excessive stress on transport and other logistics.116 
Within Transcaucasia, debates revolved around arguments of economic 
geography. The geographical proximity of Baku to Iran, which had been 
a justification for the existence of the fair in the 1920s, was now seen as a 
disadvantage. The expert Nikolai Bobynin (former member of the Russian 
Constituent Assembly) suggested an entirely new system of cross-border 
trade.117 He proposed to differentiate and spatially separate functions of the 
113 See also a report presented at the ZVTP: Protocol No. 3 of the Board, ZVTP, November 
20, 1928 // SUITA. F. 719. Op.1. D. 19. Ll. 8-9. 
114 Novye zadaniia Bakinskoi iarmarki // Zaria Vostoka. 1927. 30 December. No. 1665. P. 
1. On the fair as a space of personal contacts and information flow, see Clifford Geertz. 
The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing // American Eco-
nomic Review. 1978. Vol. 68. No. 2. Pp. 28-32. 
115 E. A. Osokina. V tiskakh sovetskoi torgovli // S. A. Pavliuchenkov (Ed.). Rossiia 
nepovskaia. Moscow, 2002. Pp. 403-418. 
116 This was noticed from the very beginning by numerous actors involved. See a letter by 
the German general consul in Tiflis of April 8, 1925: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen 
Amts (PA AA). Länderabteilung III. R 92391. 
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traditional fair by developing a dual system. To inform foreign merchants 
about new products, permanently functioning industry and trade exhibitions 
were to be open in a few Transcaucasian cities. At the same time, a network 
of “export bases” (trading posts) would conduct trade on a regular basis right 
on the border. Specifically, for Iranian trade, it was proposed that these be 
located in Julfa and in the port of Baku. 
Besides economic concerns, political considerations played a role in the 
decision to skip the fair in 1928. In the Caucasus, the rising suspicions of 
foreigners on behalf of the political police (OGPU) had led to a campaign 
of forcing Turkish and Iranian nationals to renounce their citizenship under 
the threat of extradition.118 Iranian consuls were put under secret surveil-
lance, and their activity was increasingly restricted. Requests made by the 
Iranian government to open vice-consulates in Caucasian cities where Iranian 
citizens lived were routinely turned down.119 Traditionally high numbers of 
Iranian residents in the Transcaucasian borderland, and the blurred bound-
ary between the social identity of Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijanis were 
becoming increasingly perceived as a threat.120 New conventions on the 
border regime signed with Turkey and Iran in 1927−28 marked a step toward 
further regulation of transborder trade in the region.121 Iranian diplomats, 
and even more so ordinary citizens returning from Transcaucasia, spread the 
word about the crisis of the Bolshevik regime. These regional developments 
coincided with a general turn in Soviet foreign policy toward closing the 
country. It was the moment, in the words of Terry Martin, when “it became 
clear to the Soviet leadership that cross-border ties could not be exploited to 
undermine neighboring countries, but instead had the opposite potential.”122 
The stake on the “Piedmont principle” (using borderlands as venues for dis-
seminating propaganda and exerting influence over neighboring countries) 
was abandoned after 1929. To avoid the danger of applying that “Piedmont 
118 Letter of Pavlunovskii, head of the Transcaucasian GPU, to the Zakkraikom and 
republican GPUs, December 24, 1926 // SSSA-PA. Osobaia papka. F. 1. Op. 1. D. 1. 
L. 25-26. 
119 Protocol No. 40 of the presidium of the Zakkrajkom, October 20, 1928 // SSSA-PA. 
F. 13. Op. 6. D. 11. L. 132-133. 
120 Protocol No. 60 of the presidium of the Zakkrajkom, July 2, 1927 // SSSA-PA. F. 13. 
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Munich, 2003. Pp. 555-557. 
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107
Ab Imperio, 4/2013
principle” now against the USSR, a series of ethnic-cleansing campaigns 
swept over the Soviet border territories in the 1930s. The Baku fair, with 
its high concentration of unsupervised contacts with foreigners, fell prey to 
the growing isolationism of the USSR.123
The 1927 trade treaty with Iran further undermined the idea of the fair, 
this time compromising the Iranian business counterparts. Critics pointed 
to the “fragmented” character of Iranian commerce dominated by private 
firms, in stark contrast to the integrated system of government-controlled 
Soviet trusts. It was argued that the proper balance of trade could be ef-
fectively sustained only by large companies (like the Soviet), not by small 
Iranian traders.124 Still, no working mechanism of transborder trade was 
readily available to replace the Baku fair within a feasible time, and the 
flow of goods across the Iranian border was disrupted. This compelled the 
Soviet People’s Commissariat of Trade to hastily announce in early August 
1928 that the Baku fair would reopen in late winter 1929, much earlier in 
the year than the previous fairs.125 It was clear, however, that this was not 
the restoration of the fair in its original format: the organizers were required 
to put on display only samples of the wholesalers of the traded merchandise 
and to fulfill signed contracts by delivering the goods directly to customers, 
avoiding the fair grounds. This was explained based on the need to relieve 
the railways, overstrained by the launch of the first Five-Year Plan.126 Soviet 
firms participating in the fair were required to exhibit their merchandise 
jointly, all in the same pavilion built by the Transcaucasian State Trade 
Company, in order to produce an enhanced image of Soviet economic po-
tential and to avoid “unnecessary competition.”127
The last Baku fair was opened with a delay, and operated from March 
15 to April 15, 1929. At the Chamber of Commerce of Azerbaijan, they 
123 Which Jörg Baberowski has characterized as the “Suche nach Eindeutigkeit.” Cf. 
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1999. Vol. 47. Pp. 482-504. 
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1928. No. 69 (1735). P. 3. 
125 Bakinskaia iarmarka // Zaria Vostoka.1928. 7 August. No. 181 (1847). P. 1. 
126 Executive report on the ZVTP’s activity, 1928−1929, October 1929 // SUITA. F. 719. 
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were concerned that the lapse of the Baku fair in 1928 would have had the 
most dramatic consequences for attendance at the fair, particularly among 
Iranian merchants, who would not show up. The reality did not justify 
these pessimistic expectations: official statistics of the 1929 fair registered 
372 Iranian participants, and trade turnover reached 16 million rubles, of 
which over 11 million rubles was generated by transactions with Iran. This 
was well below the benchmark set in 1927, but still demonstrated the high 
interest of foreign merchants in the Baku fair, despite its changed format, 
reduced privileges, and imposed legal restrictions.128 The relative success 
of the 1929 fair was achieved in good part by an active advertisement cam-
paign in Northern Iran. Soviet diplomats persuaded their Iranian colleagues 
of the importance of the resumed Baku fair, and asked them to spread the 
word about it at home.129 These measures were deemed absolutely neces-
sary, as Soviet managers responsible for the foreign trade in Transcaucasia 
admitted in private that they had to rebuild mutual confidence with Iranian 
merchants from scratch.130
Despite the relatively successful reanimation of the Baku fair in 1929, 
this form of international economic cooperation was doomed because of 
the profound transformation of the Transcaucasian entangled borderland. 
The crackdown on migrants and traditional Iranian cross-border social and 
commercial networks in Azerbaijan in 1929 and the appalling arbitrariness 
of these measures stirred mass discontent and official protest by the Iranian 
embassy in Moscow. This led the ZSFSR party leadership (Zakkraikom) to 
demand that the head of the Transcaucasian GPU, Stanislav Redens, abide 
closely by official regulations in order to avoid diplomatic scandals.131 This 
did not stop the outflow of Iranian citizens following the last Baku fair and 
the first months of collectivization. In the Iranian port city of Astara on the 
Caspian sea, 2,000 families fleeing Soviet Azerbaijan were registered in 
1929−30.132 The Soviets did not bear sole responsibility for sealing off the 
border: the Iranian government of Reza Shah was equally interested in the 
128 Report of the Baku fair committee, June 31, 1929 // SUITA. F. 804. Op. 1. D. 2143. 
L. 1-23. 
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growing isolation of the Transcaucasus, as a measure facilitating the state- 
and nation-building efforts under way in Iran.133
These global developments had a direct impact on the Baku fair, and 
were in many ways fostered by the Baku fair itself, in both economic and 
cultural spheres. For instance, the traditional transborder unity of economic 
ties and social networks in the Southern Caucasus had been sustained, inter 
alia, by the shared system of Russian and Muslim units of measure. As of 
1924, the ZSFSR began a transition to the metric system, so that about 80 
percent of all the commercial organizations in Transcaucasia were using the 
metric system in 1927.134 This seemingly apolitical decision deeply affected 
the Baku fair, with the new symbolic divide objectifying and further deepen-
ing the distance between its participants imposed by one’s citizenship and 
place of residence. Neighboring countries also contemplated this change, but 
Turkey began adopting the metric system only in 1931, and Iran in 1935.135 
Cultural differences revealed themselves as important indicators of de-
marcation even when the neighboring countries pursued seemingly similar 
policies. Thus, between August 1927 and December 1928, the Pahlavi regime 
passed a series of laws requiring both men and women to wear Western-style 
dress.136 Some Iranian merchants adopted the new clothes, duly impress-
ing Soviet observers when they returned to Baku for the 1929 fair.137 The 
Iranian state, however, lacked the authority of the regimes in Turkey and 
133 Richard Tapper. Frontier Nomads of Iran. A Political and Social History of the Shahse-
van. Cambridge, 1997. Pp. 283-285; Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet. Frontier Fictions. Shaping 
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Russian case, see Michael D. Gordin. Measure of All the Russias. Metrology and Gov-
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the Soviet Union to effectively enforce the new dress code in the face of 
popular resistance.138 Accounts of Iranian reforms in Azerbaijani newspapers 
underscored their half-heartedness and contrasted them unfavorably with 
Soviet reforms.139 The logic of modernization in the Soviet Union and Iran 
drove Soviet Azerbaijan and Northern Iran away from each other, disrupting 
traditional cultural and economic ties. 
Conclusion
The decision to abolish all commercial fairs in the Soviet Union was 
made on February 6, 1930. The transition to the planned economy and “ra-
tionalized” commercial relations with Eastern countries had diminished the 
significance of the Baku fair long before this formal ban.140 Even though the 
main criticism of fairs was formulated in economic terms, the consequences 
of closing the Baku fair well exceeded the sphere of economics. It delivered 
a blow to the economic and political autonomy of Soviet Azerbaijan and the 
ZSFSR, culminating the process of unmaking the former cross-border unity 
of the Transcaucasian region.141 Until 1926, the Soviet leaders of Azerbaijan 
and ZSFSR relied on the economic potential of that unity as a political re-
source to bolster their political weight against Moscow. Close relations with 
neighboring Muslim countries were an important part of their autonomous 
status. Central authorities were satisfied with this arrangement as long as 
Azerbaijan was seen as a political and cultural Piedmont, a proxy used to 
influence if not manipulate Iran. As a result, the cross-border commercial 
network established by Iranian and Azerbaijani merchants well before 
Sovietization had been mostly retained, in the format of the Baku fair. The 
1926−27 economic and political crisis marked a turning point in Soviet–Ira-
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nian bilateral relations, and put a serious strain on the cross-border networks. 
Tightening of the border control and persecutions of Iranian citizens came 
hand in hand with the difficulties experienced by the Baku fair. The new 
trade treaty with Iran shifted the balance of transborder commerce in favor 
of all-Union trusts and government agencies, reducing the autonomy of 
Azerbaijani traders. The progressive destruction of regional economic ties 
and the closing of the Azerbaijan border had a severe economic impact on 
Northern Iran. Because of its geographic location, it could not easily find 
a substitute for the lost market of Soviet Transcaucasia, and was heavily 
stricken by the 1929 crisis.142 On the Soviet side of the border, economic 
consequences were not as harsh, since Transcaucasia was integrated into 
the larger Soviet economic system. The political consequences, however, 
were significant. Closed borders and diminished direct cross-border trade 
meant less autonomy for the region. The demise of the Baku fair was one 
of the most vivid manifestations of the spatial revolution that reshaped the 
mental, economic, and political geography of the Caucasus, breaking an-
cient connections and putting the “two Azerbaijans” on diverging tracks.143
SUMMARY
From 1922 to 1930, the Baku trade fair played a key role in the develop-
ment of economic relations between the Soviet Union and Northern Iran. 
Conceived by Azerbaijani leaders as a means to increase their influence in 
the Transcaucasian Federation and vis-à-vis the central authorities, it main-
tained a high level of economic interdependence between Soviet Azerbaijan 
and Iranian border regions. It was also a powerful channel for political and 
cultural interactions. However, the spatial revolution that accompanied the 
consolidation of the Bolshevik regime entailed a progressive refiguring of 
Soviet peripheries and severing of traditional cross-border economic and 
cultural contacts. The end of the NEP created a rift between Iranian merchants 
and Soviet economic institutions, undermining the importance of the fair. 
After the first crisis in 1926−1927, the Baku trade fair was subjected to ever 
142 Consul Urquhart to Mr. Butler, Tabriz, August 31, 1936 // PRO. FO 416/94. Pp. 76-87. 
143 For contemporary developments of the Azerbaijani borderland, see Brenda Shaffer. 
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increasing criticism and was eventually abolished in early 1930. Its disap-
pearance illustrated the successful reshaping of the Caucasian borderland 
by Soviet authorities and the disruption of traditional Azerbaijani links with 
Iran and the Middle East.
Резюме
С 1922 по 1930 г. Бакинская торговая ярмарка играла ключевую роль 
в экономических отношениях СССР и Ирана. Задуманная азербайд-
жанскими лидерами как способ усилить свое влияние в Закавказской 
Советской Федеративной Социалистической Республике в противовес 
Москве, ярмарка поддерживала традиционно глубокую экономическую 
интеграцию хозяйства советского Азербайджана и приграничных 
провинций Северного Ирана. Пространственная революция, сопро-
вождавшая становление и консолидацию большевистского режима, 
стала причиной изменения характера советских окраин и разрушения 
традиционных трансграничных экономических и культурных связей. 
Свертывание нэпа усилило напряжение между иранскими купцами и 
советскими торговыми организациями, подрывая экономическое зна-
чение ярмарки. После первого кризиса Бакинской ярмарки (1926−1927) 
она стала объектом нарастающей критики и в итоге была закрыта в 
1930 г. Прекращение Бакинской ярмарки свидетельствовало об успеш-
ной трансформации советских окраин и окончательном разрушении 
традиционных связей Азербайджана с Ираном и Ближним Востоком.
